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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I. 
Appellees are not permitted to raise for the first time on 
appeal determinative issues of law which were not presented to the 
lower court or relied upon as an initial defense• Appellees herein 
have asserted in their brief on appeal for the first time that 
Sections 61-2-2(8) and 61-2-18 U.C.A. 1953 (as amended) are 
determinative of the issues on appeal. The former relates to the 
definition of a "real estate", and the latter to an affirmative 
defense which the appellee has not previously asserted. Those 
statutes are not determinative of any issue raised by the appeal, 
and do not relate to any factual or legal matters presented in the 
lower court. Those arguments raised for the first time on appeal 
should accordingly be disregarded as untimely. 
POINT II. 
Although the trial court did not specifically state in its 
bench ruling that the April 22, 1983 letter agreement was 
"ambiguous", the lower court did indicate that certain critical 
portions of the agreement were illegible and that the meaning was 
unclear. Under Utah law, a contract is considered to be 
"ambiguous" where, because of uncertain meaning of terms, missing 
terms, or other facial deficiencies, its meaning is unclear. 
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The lower court determined the wording of the April 22, 1983, 
letter agreement was insufficient to satisfy the "requirements of 
a brokerage agreement" or the "Statute of Frauds"; since it did not 
"spell out" anything as far as the terms; and it is appellant's 
position that parol evidence is admissible to explain the parties1 
intent and thereby the meaning of the agreement. The Statute of 
Frauds does not require that the "note or memorandum" be clear or 
unambiguous, but only that it exist. For the trial court to 
conclude as it did that the written agreement did not constitute 
a brokerage agreement or satisfy the Statute of Frauds because its 
meaning was unclear to the court is manifest error. 
POINT III. 
Under general contract principles, where fulfillment of a 
contract is dependant upon the act or consent of a third person 
which is not forthcoming, the contract cannot be enforced. 
Appellant asserts that approval by a third person of the parties1 
later agreement of May 31, 1984 was in fact an unsatisfied 
condition precedent to that agreement, and that failure to satisfy 
the condition renders the agreement unenforceable by either party. 
Since there existed at the time of the unenforceable May 31, 1984, 
agreement a prior commission agreement, it is his position that 
appellant became entitled to the payment of a commission upon 
performance, which was complete. The lower court erroneously 
2 
failed to consider available evidence of the parties1 intent in 
connection with either the earlier or the later agreement. Such 
evidence, if considered, would have made their meaning clear. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
MATTERS NOT PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT 
MAY NOT BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL 
It is well settled that matters which are not raised in the 
lower court may not be presented for the first time on appeal. 
Progressive Acquisition v. Lvtle, P.2d , 154 Utah Adv. Rep. 
31 (Utah App. 1991)(citing Franklin Fin, v. New Empire Dev. Co., 
659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983); James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799 
(Utah App. 1987). 
Appellees have raised for the first time in their responsive 
brief arguments under Sections 61-2-2(8) and 61-2-18, Utah Code 
Annotated, (1953, as amended) claiming that the provisions of those 
statutes are determinative. Since appellees have not previously 
raised those issues in the lower court, under Utah law they are now 
untimely. 
Appellees' argument under sections 61-2-2(8) and 61-2-18 
appears to raise a new affirmative defense, which is essentially 
that if appellant is to be considered a real estate broker then he 
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is estopped from maintaining an action for recovery of a 
commission. Appellees1 other new argument is that appellant is not 
a proper party to this action; a defense which was not raised or 
ruled upon previously. Appellees are precluded by Utah law from 
raising either of those arguments at this stage of the proceedings. 
Appellees1 requested interpretation of the cited statutes, which 
may or may not have been found meritorious below, is beyond the 
scope of this appeal, and should not be considered in deciding upon 
the propriety of the lower court's action. 
POINT II. 
THE LOWER COURT CONSIDERED THE APRIL 22, 1983 
LETTER TO BE UNCLEAR AND UNINTELLIGIBLE 
Appellees argue that the lower court did not find as a matter 
of law that ambiguity existed in the April 22, 1983, letter 
agreement; but found only that it was insufficient as a brokerage 
agreement to satisfy the Statute of Frauds since the "essential 
terms" for the payment of a commission were missing. Although the 
lower court did not specifically state in its bench ruling that it 
found the agreement to be "ambiguous", there is no other or better 
meaning to be derived from the court's observations regarding its 
attempts to read and understand the language of the agreement. 
This court has previously held that "[0]nly when contract 
terms are complete, clear, and unambiguous can they be interpreted 
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by the judge on a motion for summary judgment. Colonial Leasing 
v. Larson Bros. Const., 731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986)(citing Morris v. 
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 658 P.2d 1199, 1201 
(Utah 1983)). If the evidence concerning the terms of an agreement 
is in conflict, the intent of the parties as to the terms of the 
agreement is a matter to be determined by a jury. Colonial Leasing 
at 488 (emphasis added). 
Appellees argue that the trial court correctly determined that 
the April 22, 1983, letter agreement was insufficient since the 
"essential terms" for the payment of a commission were missing. 
Appellant maintains that since the trial court determined that 
certain "essential" terms were unclear and unintelligible, the 
agreement must therefore be considered as "ambiguous" to that 
extent; thereby reguiring resort to extrinsic or parol evidence to 
determine the parties1 intent, and precluding summary judgment. 
Appellees would have this court to conclude as a matter of law 
that if a written contract is presented to a court for interpre-
tation and the court cannot read or understand the content thereof 
because it is illegible, incomplete, or poorly written, both 
parties are precluded from enforcing the contract regardless what 
their intent may have been. Such a result would conceivably 
encourage contract draftsmen to prepare unclear or poorly written 
documents with a view to later avoidance of enforceability. 
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The language of a written document is considered to be 
ambiguous if the words used may be understood to support two or 
more plausible meanings. Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 131 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 28, 31 (Ct.App. 1990). The Utah Supreme Court in Faulkner v. 
Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292 (Utah 1983) held that when a contract is 
ambiguous because of "uncertain meaning of terms, missing terms, 
or other facial deficiencies", parol evidence is admissible to 
explain the parties1 intent.1 The facts of this case appear to 
fall squarely within the Faulkner holding, since according to the 
trial court's bench ruling, this contract leaves the court 
uncertain as to the meaning of its terms, has missing terms, and 
several other facial deficiencies. The agreement in this case must 
therefore be considered "ambiguous". 
The trial court's bench ruling in this case clearly 
illustrates its inability to comprehend the parties' intent from 
the language of the April 22, 1983, letter agreement. Whether an 
ambiguity exists is a question of law to be decided before parol 
evidence may be admitted, and the trial court's bench ruling can 
only be read as recognizing ambiguity. As this court stated in Big 
Butte Ranch, Inc. v. Holm, 570 P.2d 690, 691 (Utah 1977): 
[T]he court should first examine the language of the 
instruments and accord to it the weight and effect which 
1
 Grow v. Marwick Development, Inc., 621 P.2d 1249 (Utah 
1980). 
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it nay show was intended and if the meaning is ambiguous 
or uncertain then consider parol evidence of the parties' 
intentions. 
Of course, a motion for summary judgment may not be 
granted if a legal conclusion is reached that an 
ambiguity exists in the contract and there is a factual 
issue as to what the parties intended. (Emphasis added) 
Id. at 691. 
The trial court's comments in its bench ruling clearly 
demonstrates the ambiguity. They include the following: 
And of course as I was able to read it myself, which 
I could not make it all out. (Record at 00107, page 4) 
(emphasis added) 
I am not persuaded that either the wording in paragraph 
6 or the wording in the Form A is sufficient of a 
brokerage agreement to satisfy that a commission would 
be paid upon the broker finding a willing and able buyer. 
I don't think it's sufficient writing to meet that 
requirement and must be in writing under the Statute of 
Frauds. That it does not spell out anything really as 
far as the terms. (Record at 00107, page 4) (emphasis 
added) 
I am of the opinion that the wording in the April 22nd 
letter and the Form A is not sufficient to spell out that 
anything was going to be paid regardless of what took 
place. I think the parties came down to it, that they 
did negotiate, and there may have been some misunder-
standing as far as what was supposed to be paid by [sic] 
Mr.Florence. (Record at 00107, page 5)(emphasis added) 
I don't think the letter of April 22nd or anything 
in Form A says [sic] the requirement of the law of the 
Statute of Frauds or the requirement as far as what must 
be in writing for a brokerage. (Record at 00107, page 5) 
The trial court by its comments made a legal conclusion that 
the contract's meaning was by its terms "ambiguous" or "uncertain", 
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since the document itself presented "uncertain meaning of terms, 
missing terms, or other facial deficiencies". Any one of those 
conclusions would legally preclude summary judgment; yet the trial 
court ironically granted summary judgment because of the 
uncertainties and without any attempt to resolve them by 
considering available extrinsic evidence or allowing the factual 
issue to be decided by a jury. 
An ambiguity obviously exists in paragraph six (6) of the 
April 22, 1983, agreement pertaining to the $200,000.00 annuity, 
which was not a part of the purchase price and could have no other 
purpose than as a commission. The trial court correctly observed 
that "this was a critical situation", but followed that observation 
with a comment that the court "could not make it all out." (Record 
at 00107 pp. 4-5) In other words, understanding the meaning of 
paragraph 6 was considered critical to understanding the object of 
the $200,000 annuity, but the critical paragraph of the agreement 
was illegible. Standing alone, paragraph six (6) of the agreement 
has no apparent meaning; yet it must mean something or the parties 
would not have written it into their agreement. The trial court 
erroneously made no effort to determine what it meant, and 
available extrinsic evidence clearly discloses its meaning. 
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POINT III. 
UNDER CONTRACT LAW, FAILURE TO PERFORM A 
CONDITION PRECEDENT RENDERS CONTRACT UNENFORCEABLE 
Appellees argue in Point II of their response that failure to 
satisfy the third-party approval condition precedent contained in 
the May 31, 1984, letter release had no bearing upon the 
transaction contemplated between the parties. Appellees have 
provided no authority to support their argument that failure to 
obtain third party approval as a condition precedent to an 
agreement does not effect its validity. 
The law of contracts is well settled regarding such conditions 
precedent and the necessity of satisfying them before the agreement 
becomes enforceable.2 The Restatement of Contracts (Second) 
Section 225 states the general rule as follows: 
Performance of a duty subject to a condition cannot 
become due unless the condition occurs or its non-
occurrence is excused. 
Unless it has been excused, the non-occurrence of a 
condition discharges the duty when the condition can no 
longer occur. (Emphasis added) 
The second paragraph of the May 31, 1984 agreement specific-
ally creates a condition precedent to the entire May 31, 1984 
agreement, which it is undisputed never occurred. Again, that 
paragraph provides: 
17 Am. Jur.2d Contracts, Section 320 et.seq (1964). 
9 
"This agreement is subject to approval of Mr. Joseph 
Henroid of the law firm of Nielson and Senior of Salt 
Lake City, Utah, particularly in regard to that certain 
court order of approximately October 1983 regarding the 
divorce of Giles H. and Ululani Florence." (Emphasis 
added) 
Appellees argue that there was no necessity for any action by 
Mr. Henroid because the underlying transaction itself never closed. 
The obvious flaw in that position is that the approval did not 
relate to the closing, but to the agreement as a whole. The 
reguirement was for approval of the entire agreement, unrelated to 
the closing. Both the approval of Mr. Henroid and failure of the 
closing were of course events beyond the control of appellant. 
The basic objective in construing any contract must be to give 
effect to the intentions of the parties. If possible, those 
intentions must be determined from an examination of the text of 
the agreements. Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat. Bank, 737 P. 2d 225, 229 
(Utah 1987); DuBois v. Nve, 584 P.2d 823 (Utah 1978); Qberhansly 
v. Earle, 572 P.2d 1384 (Utah 1977). It is apparent in this case 
that the trial court failed to view the two written documents as 
a whole, or harmonize them if possible. Upon finding that 
uncertainties existed, the trial court failed to consider available 
evidence of the parties1 intent outside the four corners of the 
ambiguous April 22, 1983 agreement; and without the benefit of such 
available illumination held the agreement to be unenforceable. The 
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trial court then suggested that if there were an enforceable 
brokerage agreement the May 31, 1984 release agreement would apply, 
erroneously failing to recognize the significance of a failed 
condition precedent to that later agreement. In both respects, the 
lower court erred. 
It is apparent from viewing both agreements as a whole that 
there was a commission to be paid appellant. What remain unclear 
are the details of the parties1 intentions. It is illogical that 
the appellant would agree to reduce his commission unless he was 
motivated by appellees' assurances that the transaction would 
proceed to a closing. If the appellees' position were to be 
accepted by this court, the result would be to reward a party who 
unjustifiably fails to close after full performance by another. 
As was noted by this court in Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat. Bank, at 
230 (Utah 1987), "such a holding would encourage fraudulent 
activity". Such conduct toward brokers who are lured into 
subsequent agreements assuring payment upon closing which the 
obligated party secretly intends not to conclude would be 
tantamount to fraud, and certainly contrary to public policy. The 
trial court has totally failed to consider the parties1 intent in 
entering into the agreements, and that failure constitutes 
reversible error. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellees argue that the undisputed facts demonstrate that 
Appellant is not entitled to prevail on this appeal. Appellees1 
argument fails for the obvious reason that the trial court did not 
consider either the undisputed facts, or any of the facts which 
remain in dispute. The trial court determined that the April 22, 
1983, letter agreement was unclear because the document was not 
legible and lacked certain clarifying terms, while failing to 
consider available parol evidence of the parties1 intent. If the 
court had properly considered that evidence and attempted to 
harmonize both agreements as a whole, it would have been compelled 
to recognize the existence of an enforceable agreement, or at the 
very least, genuine issues of material fact precluding summary 
judgment. The uncertainties described in the trial court's bench 
ruling are, in and of themselves, sufficient to preclude summary 
j udgment. 
The intent of the parties is a matter for the fact finder to 
consider, and is not a question of law. The gravamen of this 
appeal involves public policy which should be to protect not only 
brokers but others who have fully performed under agreements 
entitling them to compensation from loss through the unscrupulous 
actions of a buyer who inexcusably refuses to perform. 
Appellant respectfully submits that the trial court's action be 
12 
reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings as required 
by Utah law. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~ / day of June, 1991. 
'ANTHONY M. THURBER 
Attorney for Appellant 
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